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This paper shows that if a minimal proportion of poor households
is empowered with self-employment opportunities, child labour will not
arise in equilibrium. The economy will have a unique ‘good’ equilib-
rium generating a sufficiently high wage to support full child schooling.
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1 Introduction
In a seminal paper, Basu and Van (1998) (henceforth BV) offered an expla-
nation of child labour, in which a downward sloping household labour supply
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curve intersects a standard labour demand curve several times generating
multiple equilibria. One of these is a low wage equilibrium where children
will have to work along with their parents to meet family’s subsistence con-
sumption. Despite several other explanations, such as negative externality
(Baland and Robinson, 2000), parental selfishness and external bargaining
(Gupta, 2000), and credit constraints (Ranjan, 2001; Jafarey and Lahiri,
2002), the BV model has remained an inspiration for empirical investiga-
tions in this literature (see for instance, Bhalotra and Heady (2003) and
Basu et al. (2010)).
An implicit assumption crucial to the multiple equilbria of BV is that
there is no lower bound on parent’s income. Certain policies work by putting
such lower bounds, such as a minimum wage legislation (Basu, 2000) or a
ban on child labour (Basu and Van, 1998). However, it is well known that
enforcement of a ban or minimum wage is not easy and they might cause
unemployment (Basu, 2000).
In this paper, we study an intervention in the form of providing self-
employment opportunities. The intervention is self-enforcing and easy to
implement, but surprisingly it has not received sufficient attention in the
child labour literature. We show that if only a fraction of the poor house-
holds are endowed with such opportunity, the child labour equilibrium will
be eliminated.
The idea is that self-employment puts a natural lower bound on income
allowing parents to switch to self-employment at low wages and protect their
children’s education. Their withdrawal from wage employment moves the
labour supply curve inward createing excess demand (at low wages), and in
turn eliminating the child labour equilibrium. The fraction of the households
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switching to self-employment should be just enough to cause the necessary
displacement of the labour supply curve, crucial for this outcome.
This insight adds a twist to the recommendation of the microfinance
literature for extensive spread of self-employment (Morduch, 1998). We
argue that it suffices to help only a critical proportion of the households be
self-employed, as the labour market will then correct itself.
The literature on child labour is largely concentrated on the wage work-
ers or farming households (See Bhalotra and Heady (2003) and Basu et al.
(2010)). There is also significant interest in the effect of economic liber-
alisation or trade reform on child labour (Swaminathan, 1998). However,
the evidence of parental occupations on the child’s likelihood of being out
of school is somewhat limited. From a socioeconomic point of view, self-
employed households running small shops or informal businesses are consid-
ered to be better off than the wage worker households. This is so, because
self-employment provides a minimum assured income, which also justifies
microfinance. If so, then the possibility of multiple equilibrium in the labour
market as argued by Basu and Van (1998) diminishes. This paper investi-
gates this possibility.
Having said that, there is also an issue that the self-employed house-
holds may have a perverse incentive to employ their own children, cutting
short their education. This particular aspect is being explored in Pal and
Saha (2019), where they find that if own children could be employed, then
they will be used more when the market wage rises (as a substitute for the
market labour), and less when the market wage falls. In equilibrium, the
child labour patterns would be different between the wage worker households
and the self-employed households. The existing literature has not studied
how self-employment affects child labour. This paper looks at one of the
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two above mentioned implications of self-employment. In their preliminary
empirical analysis, Pal and Saha (2019) do find statistically significant and
positive relationship between parental self-employment status and child’s
work hours. This is similar to the findings on the child labour impact of
microfinance, such as Hazarika and Sarangi (2008) for rural Malawi, and
Islam and Choe (2013) for rural Bangladesh. But we need to be aware that
these results vary across countries; for example, Karlan and Zinman (2009)
found the opposite relationship in Manila.1 Clearly, the theoretical connec-
tions between parental self-employment and child labour are intriguing, and
there is need for more empirical investigations.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the main
model and the results, followed by some concluding remarks in Section 3.
2 The model
We consider the same setup as in BV with N households, each of which
consists of one parent and one child, each having 1 unit of labour to sup-
ply. One unit of child labour is equivalent to γ(< 1) unit of adult labour.2
Households are identical except in one respect: α proportion of them have
self-employment (SE) opportunity, and (1 − α) proportion is entirely de-
pendent on wage employment (WE). In both households the child’s time is
1There is also a literature on the effect of minimum wage increase on child labour; see
Menon and Rodgers (2018) for India. Minimum wage increase helps to reduce child’s work
within the household sector, but has no impact on his/her outside work.
2The assumption of one child is merely for simplicity. Unless one wishes to introduce
other types of activities such as babysitting by an elder sibling, or issues like gender
discrimination between children, adding more children to the model is unnecessary; the
result will be unaltered.
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divided between outside work e and schooling (1 − e). The child wage is
denoted as ω. The WE parents inelastically supply their labour to earn w
each. The SE parents, on the other hand, split their time between wage em-
ployment (l) and self-employment (1− l). The income from self-employment
is given by R(x) with R′(x) > 0 and R′′(x) < 0, where x = 1− l. Thus, the
total income of an SE parent is y(w) = wl +R(x) = wl +R(1− l).
An important assumption is that the self-employed parents do not engage
any other labour input either from home or outside. If, other labour inputs
were permitted, they could use their own children, and the model would have
different implications. This case is being studied in Pal and Saha (2019).3
A set of competitive firms employ both child and adult labour as sub-
stitutes (the substitution axiom of BV) and their aggregate labour demand
(expressed in adult unit) is given by LD = LD(w,ω) which is declining in
both (w,ω). For both types of labour to be used the relation ω = γw must
hold (the ridge-line equilibrium condition of BV).
Parents must meet a subsistence consumption c before they value educa-
tion (the luxury axiom of BV). Thus, for both groups the objective function
is same:
U = (c− c)(1− e) if c ≥ s (1)
= (c− c) if c < c,
where c is parent’s consumption and βc is child’s consumption ( β < 1).
3In their study based on the Indian Human Development Survey data of 2004-05, the
authors find that 46% households (from a sample of 33,814 households) were self-employed,
and from these households 11% children (aged 10-14) worked, while from other households
7% children worked. The difference in the proportions of child labour is statistically
significant.
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The budget constraint for the WE and the SE parents respectively is
w + eγw ≥ c(1 + β), (2)
wl +R(1− l) + eγw ≥ c(1 + β). (3)
Parents maximize (1) with respect to (e, c) or (e, c, l) (depending on
being WE or SE) subject to their respective constraint (2) or (3).
The wage-employed household. A typical WE household’s optimal
child labour supply is given by




















where σ = c(1 + β). If the adult wage exceeds (falls below) a high (low)
wage level, child studies (works) full time. At moderate wages, he works part
time, and it is easy to check that e′W (w) < 0. The household’s combined
labour supply (in adult unit) is zW = 1 + γeW (w), which is also downward
sloping at all w ∈ ( σ1+γ ,
σ
1−γ ).
Now consider a special case, where all households are wage-employed.
The economy’s aggregate labour supply curve (expressed in adult labour
unit) is LS(w) = N [1 + γeW (w)]. Suppose L
D(w) (≡ L(w, γw)) intersects
LS(w) at three places as shown in Fig. 1. Two stable equilibria4 occur at
points G and B called ‘good’ and ‘bad’ equilibria, respectively. At G, wage
is high and no child works. At B, wage is low and no child goes to school;
they work instead. This is the BV model. Note that for both equilibria to
co-exist, labour supply must exceed labour demand between wU and wB.
















The self-employed household. We show that with a self-employment
option, the excess labour supply between wU and wB can be eliminated.
Consider an SE household’s labour supply decision (l, eS), given by (5)-(6):
−R′(1− l) + w = 0, (5)
σ + γw − y(l(w), w)− 2γwe = 0. (6)
The adult labour supply for wage employment l(w) given by (5) is in-
creasing in w (i.e. l′(w) = − 1R′′(.) > 0), and for simplification assume
R′(1) = 0 allowing us to set l(0) = 0.
We can now write y(l(w), w) ≡ y(w) = wl(w) + R(1 − l(w)). By differ-
entiating y(.) with respect to w, we obtain
y′(w) = [l + wl′(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸]−R′(1− l)l′(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0 > 0
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As both terms are positive, as such the sign of y′(w) is ambiguous. However,
intuitive reasoning would help us conclude that y(w) would be monotonically
increasing as demonstrated in Fig. 2, or at least be flat at R(1).
To understand why y(w) would be non-decreasing, we first note that
l(w) maximizes the parent’s total income y(l(w), w) = wl+R(1− l(w)) with
respect to l. Hence, his total income must be at least w or R(1), because
he can work full time either outside or at self-employment and guarantee
himself of w or R(1), whichever is maximum. So given any w, say w0, if
he finds splitting his time between self-employment (say, 1− l unit of time)
and outside (l unit of time) a better option than being fully self-employed
or being fully wage-employed, it must be that y(l(w0), w0) > max[R(1), w0].
Now, starting from w0 if w rises further, the parent can at least maintain
the same allocation of time and earn more from wage- employment. If indeed
l(w) is continuous and strictly increasing, then extra earning from wage-
employment will more than compensate for the loss in self-employment.
Therefore, y(w) must be increasing or will be just a flat line R(1) at all w.
In Fig. 2 we demonstrate the increasing case.
Observation 1 (i) The self-employed parent’s income will have the follow-
ing lower bound: y(l(w), w) ≥ max[w, R(1)]. (ii) The self-employed parent’s
total income must be either increasing in w or at least be non-decreasing in
w.
A second implication of the self-employment option is that if R(1) – the








Fig. 2: Shape of y(w) 
l(w1)=1 
the subsistence consumption σ, the child will not have to be sent to work. Of
course, the self-employment technology needs to be sufficiently productive.
To consider a non-trivial case, assume σ > R(1), so that providing schooling
still depends on the equilibrium wage.
Now consider Eq. (6). There are two critical wages. Set e = 0 and let w̄
implicitly solve σ+γw−y(w) = 0. At any wage above w̄ child labour supply
is zero. If the parent’s total income covers the subsistence consumption and
the foregone child income (γw) the child is kept at school full time. On the
other hand, if e = 1 and w implicitly solves σ − γw − y(w) = 0, then we
can say that at all wage below w the child will work full time. Here, the
combined income of the child and the parent hardly covers the subsistence
consumption. More formally, the child labour supply of an SE household is
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Fig. 3: Equilibrium with only self-employed parents 
a: Household b: Market 
= 1 for w < w.














This is due to our assumption that σ > R(1) and the fact that y(.) is
maximized by l. The combined labour supply curve of the SE household is
zS = l(w) + γeS . At w ∈ [w, w̄], z′S(w) = l′(w) + e′S(w) which is ambiguous
in sign. But at w > w̄ and w < w, clearly z′S(w) = l
′(w) > 0. Then at all
w that are close to, but still less than, w̄ the curve must bend backward to
turn upward sloping again. Fig. 3a shows the household supply curve being
backward bending. Fig. 3b shows that if all households were SE then we
can have a unique market equilibrium where the adult wage is sufficiently
high to support full child schooling.
For Fig. 3b to be valid we must have that the SE households supply less
labour than the WE households. The following observation confirms this.
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Observation 2 (i) An SE child switches to full schooling earlier, and drops
out of school later than a WE child. (ii ) The total labour supply of an SE
household is less, or no greater, than that of a WE household.
Part (i) of the above observation requires proving that w̄ < σ1−γ and
w < σ1+γ (refer to Eq. (4)). To see this let us consider Eq. (7). At w = w̄
we have σ + γw̄ − y(w̄) = 0, or σ + γw̄ + w̄ − w̄ − y(w̄) = 0, which yields
σ − [y(w̄)− w̄] = w̄(1− γ),
or w̄ =





This is because y(w) must be no less than w or R(1) whichever is maximum.
Similarly, consider w at which we have σ − γw − y(w) = 0, obtain
σ − [y(w)− w] = w(1 + γ),
or w =





For part (ii) of the observation, compare Eq. (4) with Eq. (7) for
w ∈ [ σ1+γ , w̄]. Since w ≤ y(w), we have eW ≥ eS . The SE parent’s labour
supply is l(w) ≤ 1. Hence, the SE household’s labour supply never exceeds
that of the WE household. In particular, zS < zW at w ≤ σ1−γ .
Elimination of the bad equilibrium. Now consider the aggregate
labour supply with mixed households: LS(w;α) = N [αzS(w)+(1−α)zW (w)].
In Fig. 1 we have α = 0 and by construction there are three equilibria; in
Fig. 2b we have α = 1 and by construction there is only one equilibrium.
Then for LS(w;α) we may have one or three equilibria depending on the
magnitude of α. LS(.) is a declining function of α.
Let us consider all w ∈ [0, σ1−γ ] and define an excess labour demand
function φ(w;α) = LD(w) − LS(w;α). By construction, for α = 0 there
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exists an interval of w such that φ(w) < 0 over the entire interval, and for
α = 1 at all w (≤ σ1−γ ), φ(w) > 0. Since φ(.) is a continuous and increasing
function of α, by the intermediate value theorem there must exist a critical
α, say α̂, such that φ(w; α̂) = 0 at some w and strictly positive at all other
w ≤ σ1−γ .
Fig. 4 shows this critical α at which the labour supply curve swings
back sufficiently to be just tangent to the labour demand curve at some
wage between wU and wB where previously there was an excess supply. The
result is that there is only one equilibrium which not only supports full
schooling for all children, but also improves the equilibrium wage to w∗, as
the new equilibrium point G′ is to the north-west of the old equilibrium
point G.
Proposition 1 If the self-employment opportunity R(.) is made available
to the α̂ fraction (or more) households, then the economy will have only the
good equilibrium with child labour eliminated.
3 Concluding remarks
The policy implication of the result of this paper is dramatic. To eliminate
child labour, all households need not be targeted for intervention. All we
need is to intervene up to a critical proportion. A related question is how
productive self-employment should be to have the required impact. Our
model suggests that if R(1) ≥ wB (i.e., the bad equilibrium wage), SE par-
ents will withdraw from the market, which in turn would push the wage
upward. From the literature on microfinance it is seen that extensive pro-
vision of small loans can have a significant impact on household welfare
12














including child schooling (see Morduch, 1999) and access to microfinance
makes self-employment sustainable (see Crepon et al. 2014). We argue
that from the child labour perspective a minimal intervention might just be
sufficient.
There is also a caveat in order. A number of studies, such as Islam and
Choe (2013) for Malawi, and Hazarika and Sarangi (2008) for Bangladesh,
and also the ongoing work of Pal and Saha (2019) for India have shown that
children from the self-employed households are also more likely to work as
child labour (and receive less education) primarily because of a substitution
between home labour and outside labour triggered by an outside wage in-
crease. This substitution has not been allowed in the present paper, which
is clearly a limitation; but in reality, that possibility has to be taken into ac-
count. Therefore, our model has more relevance to those contexts where the
self-employment activity is not scalable, i.e., it cannot be expanded by hiring
additional labour, especially child labour. For example, a child is unsuitable
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to man a family-run shop, or cook in a family-run eatery. Our model is also
applicable where Tor where the microfinance intervention augments mainly
the the human capital of the beneficiary and the business is predominantly
his/her skill based. It is in these contexts, credit interventions will likely
have a positive effect of the kind that we established.
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